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Abstract Re-framing is the process by which a person
‘‘fills the gap’’ between what is expected and what has
been observed, that is, to try and make sense of what is
going on following a surprise. It is an active and adaptive
process guided by expectations, which are based on
knowledge and experience. In this article, surprise situa-
tions in cockpit operations are examined by investigating
the re-framing process. The results show difficulties that
pilots have in re-framing following surprise, including the
identification of subtle cues and managing uncertainties
regarding automated systems, coping with multiple goals,
tasks and narrow time frames and identifying an appro-
priate action. A crew-aircraft sensemaking model is pre-
sented, outlining core concepts of re-framing processes
and sensemaking activities. Based on the findings, three
critical areas are identified that deserve further attention
to improve pilot abilities to cope with unexpected events;
(1) identification of what enables and obstructs re-fram-
ing, (2) training to build frames and develop re-framing
strategies and (3) control strategies as part of the re-
framing process.
Keywords Sensemaking  Surprise  Cockpit operations 
Re-framing  Training
1 Introduction
In the past few decades, the role and tasks of pilots have
gone from flying the aircraft by means of manual control,
to an increased role as managers of automated systems.
Such changes inevitably bring about new challenges in
operations and have resulted in a number of unintended
consequences. Examples include ‘‘automation surprises’’,
new attention and knowledge demands, unevenly dis-
tributed workload, a degradation of operators’ manual skill
and over-trust in automation (Sarter et al. 1997; Woods and
Hollnagel 2006). The Performance-Based Operations
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (PARC)/Civil Aviation
Safety Team (CAST) working group (FAA 2013) states
that a major factor in aircraft incidents and accidents is that
pilots are failing to keep up with technological changes,
resulting in surprise and confusion. Their report (FAA
2013) suggests that insufficient crew knowledge of the
automated systems is a factor in more than a third of the
accidents and serious incidents.1 Example situations
include American Airlines flight 965 controlled flight into
terrain near Cali (ACRC 1995), an over-speed incident
(AAIB 2004) and a runway excursion in snowy conditions
(NTSB 2002). Other recent accidents connected to diffi-
culties with automated systems include Turkish Airlines
flight 1951 in Amsterdam where the flight crashed during
the approach (Dutch Safety Board 2010) and Air France
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Due to complex automated system logic and non-trans-
parent system feedback, pilots’ understanding of all ongoing
processes in the cockpit is inherently incomplete (Klein et al.
2004). Incomplete models result in the construction of sim-
plified models of the world and oversimplification (Feltovich
et al. 2004; Sarter et al. 1997). In most situations, not having
full understanding is not a problem, as procedures and
checklists guide pilots in managing system variations and
failures. However, as events unfold, such as multiple dis-
turbances and failures, the complexity of the systems may
entail difficulties in identifying subtle cues and isolating
failures that, over time, may progress into serious accidents
(Woods and Sarter 2000). Also, studies show that in many
accidents where the automation was a contributing factor it
actually operated as designed (Dekker and Woods 2002),
such as the accident of flight TK1951 near Schiphol in 2009
(Dutch Safety Board 2010). These findings suggest that the
understanding of pilot-automation coordination deserves
further attention.
The advances of technology in modern cockpits have
increased the reliability of the technology, which decreases
the variations and disturbances pilots are exposed to in
normal operations. Training programmes today largely
focus on pre-defined skills in context-specific scenarios
where pilots know what to expect. In a recent study, pilots
were confronted with abnormal events in the context of a
training scenario, and they quickly recognised and carried
out the solutions (Casner et al. 2013). However, when
presented with similar events in a different context, they
failed to recognise and recall the appropriate response,
implying that responses learned and practised during air-
line training may not generalise to more naturalistic set-
tings (Casner et al. 2013). The ability to quickly diagnose a
problem and the ability to carry out a solution are qualities
that define an expert (Klein et al. 2004) and can be con-
trasted to the novice that has to work through the problem
in a more time-consuming manner to derive a solution. To
be an expert, however, requires practice in varying contexts
with different combinations of problems. Skills to deal with
the unexpected and to ‘‘be prepared to be unprepared’’ in
cockpit operations are today largely left to mature though
experience (Dekker and Lundstro¨m 2006).
As implied by the aforementioned studies and investiga-
tions, critical issues to improve airline safety are crew-au-
tomation coordination and crew ability to make sense of and
‘‘frame’’ the situation following unexpected events. In this
study, we examine the pilots’ (re)-framing process to identify
challenges and enablers of the sensemaking process.
This study was carried out as part of the EU FP7
‘‘Man4Gen’’ research project,2 which aimed to identify
factors that affect the ability of flight crew and aircraft to
handle unexpected events and maintain control of the air-
craft. The research presented in this paper was carried out
during the first year of the project to specify research
questions for the project, frame core concepts and gather
contextual details of surprise situations in cockpit opera-
tions for use in upcoming simulator experiments.
1.1 Sensemaking and the re-framing process
In psychology, there has been a tradition to study how
people perceive and understand the world in controlled
laboratory settings (Hoffman and Mcneese 2009). How-
ever, the transferability of models of human cognition
derived through laboratory experiments in a complex and
dynamic setting is being questioned, as are the assumptions
researchers make on human abilities and limitations as a
result of them (Hoffman and Woods 2000; Klein et al.
2003). Examples include studies that show how domain
experts satisfy options rather than optimise them (Klein
and Calderwood 1991; Zsambok and Klein 1997) and how
people not only seek to confirm their hypothesis (com-
monly referred to as confirmation bias) but also seek to
disconfirm their hypothesis (Pliske et al. 2004). Studies in
sensemaking, macrocognition and cognitive systems engi-
neering are further examples of research efforts in better
understanding human-technology work systems in complex
and dynamic settings.
The study of sensemaking is a central function of
macrocognition, that is, the study of how people make
sense in a real-world setting (Hoffman and Mcneese 2009;
Klein et al. 2003; Malakis and Kontogiannis 2013).
Underlying the development of studying macrocognitive
functions in human-technical systems is the research field
of cognitive systems engineering (CSE), which emerged in
the early 80 s (Hollnagel and Woods 1983, 2005; Woods
and Hollnagel 2006). CSE is devoted to the understanding
of how complex human-technical systems maintain control
in dynamic environments (Hollnagel and Woods 2005). It
is a systemic approach for analysing, evaluating and
designing systems, with the view that humans and machi-
nes cannot be studied as separate units in isolation of their
context, but as part of a joint system. For example, studies
may target how operators detect and manage anomalies
(Watts-Perotti and Woods 2007; Woods and Hollnagel,
2006) and extract relevant information from multiple
ongoing processes (Christoffersen et al. 2007).
A central view in CSE is that perception is active rather
than passive and guided by expectation. The control loop
of the contextual control model (COCOM) presented by
(Hollnagel and Woods 2005) demonstrates the cyclic nat-
ure of how control is retained in a perception–action cycle,
emphasising that we use the past to make sense of the
2 Manual Operations for 4th Generation Airliners (2012–2015),
http://man4gen.eu/.
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present, and that the context is an intricate part of people’s
assessments and how they act. The model, which builds on
Neisser’s perceptual cycle (1976), is the basis for analysing
the dynamic process of joint systems control and for
interpreting how people take action where the context
determines the actions. The core constituents of the
COCOM control loop are ‘‘Events-Frame-Actions-Events-
…’’ (see Fig. 1 in Chapter 4 for two interlinked such
loops), which represent the continuous cycle of contextual
feedback (events) shaping action through the current
understanding (frame). Events are affected externally or by
the actions taken, and the current frame guides perception.
Central for the ability to control a process and adapt in an
appropriate manner is sensemaking (Klein et al. 2006).
Sensemaking is the process of structuring the unknown and
can be described as the interaction of seeking information,
ascribing meaning and action (Weick et al. 2005). Making
sense of a situation is an ongoing process which is con-
stantly (and for the most part unconsciously) being revised
as the world around changes.
The notion of sensemaking was introduced by Weick
(1995), who described it as a response to experiencing a
surprise; the process of sensemaking is initiated when there
is a discrepancy between what is observed and what is
expected (Klein et al. 2010). To make sense of events thus
presupposes a conceptual framework, or a mental model,
which is the basis for our expectations that infer meaning to
observed data. The role of expectations as an important
driver in the understanding of ongoing events has been
shown in studies of human-technical systems (Christof-
fersen et al. 2007; Woods and Hollnagel 2006) and in
related areas in social sciences (e.g. Dunbar 1997). In
sensemaking terms, the conceptual framework is referred
to as frame (Klein et al. 2006, 2007). To construct a frame
means that data are ‘‘fitted into a structure that links them
to other elements’’ (Klein et al. 2007, p 118), which allows
the identification of relationships between events and pla-
ces in a coherent fashion. A person’s background and their
goals guide the target of the search, and the understanding
is modified based on what the search generates. For
example, a farmer, a sailor and a meteorologist observing
the same weather phenomena will search for cues relevant
to their goal and construct an image of the weather pattern
based on their individual expertise. When an observation
does not fit the current frame a surprise occurs, requiring an
elaboration or a re-framing of the data, an active process to
fill the ‘‘gap’’ (Klein et al. 2010). Sensemaking is thus not
the activity of solely perceiving and interpreting input from
the environment after the fact (retrospective) but the con-
tinuous process of fitting what is observed with what is
expected (anticipatory), an active process guided by our
current understanding, as illustrated in the Data/Frame
model (Klein et al. 2007). The D/F model illustration
differs from the perception–action cycle of COCOM in that
it highlights specific activities, or the ‘‘strategies’’ used,
rather than the concepts that constitute the continuous
cycle. In this sense, the COCOM cycle can be seen as an
intricate part of each sensemaking activity, such as
searching for a new frame and questioning a current frame.
Chapter 4 offers a more detailed description of the D/F
concepts, with a focus on the sensemaking activities
identified in the current study.
Klein et al. (2007) found that key elements in data serve
as anchors, that is, certain cues bring out the initial frame,
which are used to guide the search for more data. In this
sense, an expert is not someone who can interpret the data,
it is someone who can recognise the right cues to ‘‘break’’ a
frame and to identify a new, useful frame, to explain the
discrepancies. Malakis and Kontogiannis (2013) identified
performance criteria used by air traffic controllers to guide
the re-framing process and found that experts were better
than novices at applying criteria that enhanced the identi-
fication of subtle cues, which in turn, increased their
operational flexibility.
In sensemaking, there is no end-point, no ‘‘full com-
prehension’’; making sense is necessarily a continuous and
dynamic process to match the changing environment.
Weick (1995) argues that people generally do not have
‘‘the big picture’’, but rely on how plausible a frame is, and
use that to search for reasonable explanations. Klein et al.
(2007) similarly discuss just-in-time frames, that is, we rely
mainly on local cause-effect connections that we detect and
not on a comprehensive mental model of an entire system.
Similarly, regarding the complex automated systems in a
modern airliner, it would be inconceivable for pilots to
have full detailed comprehension of all technical systems.
The focus of frame construction differs from, for
example, the widely used concept of situation awareness
(Endsley 2006), which is a state (of knowledge) attained by
an individual based on data or inferences of data in the
environment and is used to make predictions about the
future. Studies of sensemaking, on the other hand, are
about the processes used to achieve such states (Klein et al.
2006; Klein et al. 2010; Malakis and Kontogiannis 2013).
Also, missing cues and displayed information is commonly
described and categorised as ‘‘loss of situation awareness’’
(Endsley 2006). This view suggests that inattentiveness
plays a key role as something is ‘‘lost’’ and fails to
recognise the importance of how context and expectations
guide the search, identification and inferences made. Fur-
ther, the view that expectations guide attention may explain
why pilots manage routine training very well, but when
faced with the same failures in an unexpected sequence
they have trouble identifying the problem, as shown by
Casner et al. (2013). In a sensemaking view, focus shifts
from questioning how to get better at being ‘‘situationally
Cogn Tech Work (2016) 18:623–642 625
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aware’’ to understanding the process of constructing frames
in different contexts (for example, flight phases and envi-
ronmental conditions).
The (re)-framing process in a cockpit environment
involves multiple processes, such as searching for data
from multiple sources, attention switching between tasks
and prioritising (see e.g. CAA 2013). Unexpected events
often increase the cognitive demands on the pilots in
other areas as well, including the number of tasks and
checklists, the frequency of communication and coordi-
nation, the management of automated systems and the
adaptation of plans (Bergstro¨m et al. 2011; Billings 1997;
Dekker et al. 2008; Pruchnicki and Woods 2013; Woods
and Patterson 2000). Often, there is an element of
uncertainty making the retrieval of frames increasingly
challenging, particularly in time-critical situations. A
previously noted a tendency is to rationalise anomalies to
make them fit the current frame, also described as fixation
error (De Keyser and Woods 1990; Sarter et al. 1997).
Getting stuck, or fixating, on a narrow interpretation of
the situation makes re-framing a challenge despite con-
tradicting and ambiguous data (Feltovich and Hoffman
2004; Lanir 1986; Sarter et al. 1997).
In this paper, mismatches between the observed and
the expected (a surprise) are used as the starting point to
examine the (re-)framing process of pilots in cockpit
operations. Through interviews, cases of surprise in the
cockpit have been gathered, which have been interpreted
and analysed through the lens of a CSE and sense-
making perspective, applying concepts from the
COCOM model (Hollnagel and Woods 2005) and the
D/F model (Klein et al. 2007). In the following chapter,
the method is presented, followed by a results chapter,
including example cases. The discussion chapter brings
together the findings by presenting the crew-aircraft
sensemaking model which adapts the original COCOM
model to a cockpit environment and emphasises the
sensemaking aspects of expectations and anticipatory
thinking. Further, an adapted D/F model is presented to
capture the sensemaking activities found in the pre-
sented examples. The article concludes with suggestions
for further research.
2 Method
Eliciting expert knowledge in complex dynamic systems
is challenging given the complexity of the tasks and work
context and the interviewees ability to articulate this. The
interviewers’ role requires the ability to uncover the
intricacies of the specific situation, know when to ask
further questions and feel confident that significant
aspects are covered (Miller et al. 2006). The subjectivity
of an interviewee further introduces several potential
disadvantages, such as memory alterations and biases due
to, for example, concerns about their own performance.
However, to investigate the re-framing process, interviews
may be the best means to gain in-depth insights into the
thought process of the pilots. Other methodologies that
can be considered to investigate re-framing include, for
example, a review of incidents/accidents or observations
of simulated tasks. Such methodologies may allow the
analyst to access more reliable data (if measured) to
investigate what circumstances lead to a surprise and map
the actions taken. However, they do not allow insights
into the subjective experience of the individual pilot on
naturally occurring but unusual situations. To this end, an
interview methodology was chosen for the study.
The interview technique used was guided by two
methods often applied in naturalistic decision making
research, the critical incident technique (CIT) (Flanagan
1954) and the critical decision method (CDM) (Klein et al.
1989). The goal of such methods is to elicit expert
knowledge from practitioners working in domains gov-
erned by complexity, time pressure and a dynamic envi-
ronment. The methods offer a structured way to gather
information regarding actual cases, using questions that
relate to how people work in a natural environment. Fur-
ther, the interviewee is given the opportunity to narratively
describe an incident and the interviewer can guide what
information is elicited through follow-up questions (Klein
et al. 1989).
Although the focus of CIT and CDM is on critical
incidents it should be noted that for this study there is no
requirement or implication that the incidents described
were critical in a sense that it jeopardised the safety of the
flight. The focus is on capturing knowledge regarding the
re-framing process following surprise irrespective of
whether the incident was safety–critical or a routine func-
tion with a safe outcome. Due to the disadvantages of the
methodology mentioned above (e.g. subjectivity and
memory alterations), the case descriptions are seen as
approximate accounts of the incidents and used mainly as a
source to investigate challenges and form hypotheses.
Further, no attempts were made to draw objective or
quantifiable inferences as examples vary in type and depth.
Instead, the focus was to identify the constraints and cog-
nitive demands in each context described. Although the
challenges identified are context- and pilot-specific, pat-
terns of sensemaking can be identified and compared to
other cases.
2.1 Procedure
The developed interview guide had two main parts. In the
first part, the pilots were asked to describe recent
626 Cogn Tech Work (2016) 18:623–642
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situations where they felt surprised. Follow-up questions
were used to encourage the respondents to reflect on their
experience, provide contextual detail to their narrative
and ensure that the most important aspects were covered.
In the second part of the interview, pilots were asked to
reflect on common sources of surprise in cockpit opera-
tions as well as coping strategies. Questions were used to
ensure the following areas relating to surprise situations
were covered: confusion and problem-solving, automation
and system knowledge, manual control (and mode tran-
sitions), training, procedure applicability and team
work/communication. Each interview lasted between 50
and 90 min, depending on the length and depth of the
responses.
2.2 Participants
Semi-structured interviews were carried out with 20 pilots.
The invitation to participate in the research was targeted to
include pilots with experience on modern, 4th generation,
airliners, encouraging a wide variety of backgrounds. The
pilots took part voluntarily and were not compensated for
their time. The experience of the pilots ranged from low-
experience first officers, to experienced captains, flight
instructors and training and safety managers from a number
of different western European airlines. Overall, there were
more experienced crew in the group; 14 out of 20 partici-
pants were instructors and examiners. The average number
of flight hours of the participants was 10,892 and the
average age 49.
2.3 Analysis
The analysis was carried out in three steps: (1) tran-
scription, (2) data tagging and (3) identifying patterns of
re-framing. The interviews were transcribed in full. All
identified cases of surprise situations were extracted from
the transcribed interview data, a total of 48 cases. The
cases were subsequently tagged according to the sense-
making activities, and the key areas for investigation (see
list under procedure tags). The final step of the analysis
included an iterative cross-case analysis to identify pat-
terns of what enables and disables the re-framing process
following surprise. Nine categories of challenges relating
to the re-framing process were identified in the analysis.
Table 1 presents nine cases, each one representing one of
the nine categories. Also included in Table 1 is a brief
summary of each case, the main challenge and the re-
framing activity taking place. In the results section, each
case will be presented in more detail and in the analysis
and discussion section the re-framing activities are dis-
cussed. It should be noted that several of the identified
challenges can be found in a single case (e.g. a majority
of the cases involve some degree of uncertainty
management).
3 Results
The cases elicited in the interview study offer a broad
spectrum of surprise situations in cockpit operations.
Emerging from the data are nine challenges relating to the
re-framing process (Table 1). Each of these challenges is
contextualised and discussed from sensemaking perspec-
tive using an example from each category.
3.1 Case 1: Absence of salient cues
Although a fault may be physically visible to the crew
(e.g. an autopilot is turned off) it may be hard to detect if
there are no salient cues that suggest that something is out
of the ordinary, as exemplified in Case 1. A salient cue, in
this context, is a cue that catches the attention of the
perceiver. The understanding of a situation is guided by
the current frame, and if a problem is not expected or
salient it may be hard to detect. As mentioned in the
interviews this is seen as particularly challenging when
there is a lot of ‘‘noise’’.
Case 1: The crew forgot to switch on the second
autopilot during the approach.3 This is only a prob-
lem if they have to make a go-around as this causes
the first autopilot to drop off, which is what happened
in this case. After the go-around the crew thought that
they were flying on autopilot, but the aircraft was
actually trimmed nose up since the autopilot auto-
matically puts in a nose up trim bias at the start of the
approach. The two situations initially have the same
reaction at the go-around, the aircraft pitches nose up,
but the reason why it’s happening is totally different.
Rather than being actively controlled by the autopilot
to pitch nose up, the aircraft is passively pitching
while not being actively flown (by either autopilot or
crew in this case), until the situation is corrected.
3.2 Case 2: Passive and insidious disturbances
Some pilots in the interview study felt that more passive
and insidious disturbances (i.e. disturbances that build up
without the crew being aware) are difficult to detect and a
major challenge in modern aircraft. Passive disturbances
3 On the B737NG both autopilots must be engaged during the
approach to be able to carry out a go-around with autopilots engaged.
If only one autopilot is engaged in approach mode, this autopilot will
disconnect when the go-around button is pushed and the go-around
must be done manually.
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are seen by these pilots as more likely to happen during
cruise flight when crews are less actively involved in
managing the flight path compared to the terminal flight
phase.
Case 2: During cruise flight at high altitude aircraft
can have a narrow spacing of 1000 foot. Thus, an
aircraft flying at 200–300 foot above the cleared
altitude in turbulence and the autopilot reacts slowly
to the offset they may have 400-500-600 foot of loss
or gain of altitude. Within seconds, the crew could
therefore be outside the cleared altitude limits.
As in Case 1 there is a difficulty of detecting subtle cues
when the problem is not expected. A surprise leading to a
critical situation does not have to involve problematic
interpretations of conflicting or hidden information. On the
contrary, many surprise situations reported in the study are
the result of external events such as a late change from
ATC and unexpected weather. It was mentioned that
Table 1 Overview of cases, challenges and re-framing activities
Case Short summary of events and
context
Challenge Re-framing activities
1. Absence of salient cues Forgot to switch on second
autopilot during approach.
Pilots did not detect this
during go-around, due to the
nose up trim bias of the
autopilot
Absence of salient cues,
symptoms hard to detect,
relating a symptom to a
(non)-event happening during
a different time phase
Preserve frame
(other side of questioning a
frame)
2. Passive and insidious
disturbances
Aircraft deviates from flight
level clearance. Autopilot




change of plans, unexpected
timing of events, only
seconds to act
Rapid frame- switching
3. Conflicting data Initial airspeed indicator
warning followed by multiple
warnings and failures
occurring. Aircraft deviates
from intended flight path
Conflicting and inconsistent





Abandon search for frame
Switch frame
4. Getting stuck in narrow
interpretations
Fuel imbalance warning
incorrectly identified as fuel
leak. Leads to shut down of a
healthy engine
Current frame explains
discrepancies, get stuck in a





5. Sudden changes and rapid
transitions




Rapid re-framing, high tempo
activities
Rapid frame- switching
6. Coping with insufficient
system knowledge
The crew get a spurious
glideslope warning during
approach, but no other visible
deviation
Insufficient system knowledge




7. Multiple goals and trade-offs Pilots switch roles and seats
during the flight, creating role
confusion when managing
disturbance
Manage multiple tasks, goals,
roles and responsibilities
Frame-switching
8. Uncertainty management Autopilot disengages
frequently, the crew cannot
identify a reason for the
failure. Decision is made to
cancel flight and return to
airport
Managing uncertainty, have to




Abandon search for frame
9. Roles and communication Four pilots and a technician in
a cockpit with a faulty
landing gear. Different
opinions on how to best land
the aircraft
Too many opinions on how to
land the aircraft, lack of
leadership, difficulties




(identify a common frame)
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having to change plans, that is, switch frames, always
includes an element of surprise even when the response is
clear, such as a go-around or taking manual control.
3.3 Case 3: Conflicting data
The ability to interpret cues when there is too much or
conflicting data are the most common challenge reported in
the interview study. Case 3 is an example of this.
Case 3: During the descent a crew received an audio
warning that the aircraft’s airspeed sensors are pro-
viding different data, which means that the airspeed
information from one of the sensors could be unre-
liable. To the crew’s surprise, the different airspeed
indicators in the cockpit are not showing any dis-
crepancies. The airspeed warning indication caught
the crew’s attention. However, there is no visible
indication of airspeed discrepancies, contradicting the
warning information. Not knowing what the problem
was, or even if there was an actual problem, the crew
initially thought it must be a malfunction of the
system. The next thing that happened is that they got
a wind shear failure indication on the primary flight
display, which they found awkward. They discussed
what was happening at the moment, but they couldn’t
see any differences. Then the autothrottle system
unexpectedly increased power (during the descent)
and the aircraft started to climb. At this point the
captain disconnected the autothrottle and autopilot
systems and flew manually. The altitude on the
instrument panel blanked as a result of the discon-
nect. Further, they could not remember which altitude
they were cleared to (as this is usually programmed
into the system). After contacting air traffic control
again, the crew wrote down the altitudes and clear-
ances to continue the descent. The captain had to fly
manually, basically without flight directors until they
intercepted with the instrument landing system, at
which point flight directions came back. They felt
lucky that the weather was good.
The Captain describes: ‘‘First you are confused by
the malfunctions you see, the impressions, the warn-
ings, the speed comparison and because you start
looking to airspeed on both indicators and on the
standby, and there was no difference in airspeed
indication, so you are confused as to why there is a
comparison warning and there is no difference in
speed. Because if one airspeed is unreliable you
switch to the other side. The switch is my side. And
that takes a lot of bits to figure out are we missing
something because you believe the system first and
you can’t see any reason why you have that
comparison light. Then the wind shear fail light came
on, then [I] thought, this is complicated and the
system doesn’t know really what to make of it. So that
made a big difference, the wind shear warning failure
… and it was early in the morning after a long flight,
you try with all your bits you have in your head to
figure out what is happening and you can’t figure it
out, because it is all the same and still strange things
happen and confusion took about 3–4 min and then
when said ‘‘ok, f*** the systems, put flight directors
off, and flight indication off and fly by hand’’. But you
try to figure out, because you want to do something,
you are in the cockpit to do something in these situ-
ation, but we couldn’t do anything, couldn’t do any
selections of anything because there was no checklist,
there was no common sense, there was no common
sense in the whole system.’’
Only once the aircraft deviates from the intended trajec-
tory did the captain intervene to maintain control of the
aircraft. As described by the pilot, the inconsistent feedback
from the systems made procedures and checklist inadequate
to support the crew. The crew are involved in the cyclic
process of searching for a frame to map the events, and at one
point they adopt a frame (malfunction of the system), which
guides their next actions and interpretations. This frame is,
however, discarded as other, inconsistent, failures appear. At
this point, the crew go back to searching for a new frame. The
crew are not able to identify a consistency in the observed
symptoms and thus not able to form a hypothesis of the actual
fault(s). This can be contrasted to other examples from the
interview where pilots mention that observing several
symptoms (elaborating a frame) increase the chance of
identifying the problem.
3.4 Case 4: ‘‘Getting stuck’’ in a narrow
interpretation
The example in Case 4 describes the typical structure for
‘‘getting stuck in a narrow interpretation’’; a pilot searches
for the cause of a failure and quickly finds evidence sup-
porting the initial hypothesis. Following actions focus on
taking necessary steps to manage the identified problem,
and the crew fail to acknowledge information contradicting
their hypothesis. Again, the case illustrates how the crew’s
expectations steer their actions and what data they search
for, thus missing important cues that would contradict their
assessment. Several respondents mention having experi-
enced similar situations. One respondent mentioned that
‘‘checklists and procedures encourage you to keep moving,
not to understand the problem’’.
Case 4: During cruise flight the captain leaves the
cockpit for the toilet. After the captain has left a fuel
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imbalance warning pops up. After checking the
amount of fuel in the wing tanks the first officer
notices a 600 kg difference between the left and right
tank. The first officer decides that the reason has to be
a fuel leak and pulls out the corresponding checklist
(note: the checklist includes check items to exclude
other possible reasons for a fuel imbalance). When
the captain returns to the cockpit the first officer
confronts him with the fuel problem and both are
convinced that there was a fuel leakage. Continuing
through the checklist, the crew look for evidence to
support their assessment. The continuation of the fuel
leakage checklist leads to a shutdown of a healthy
engine. Because of the shutdown, the crew never
noticed that, albeit one tank fuel was low, the other
one was still on the initial value from before take-off.
The real failure was a damaged cross-feed valve.
3.5 Case 5: Sudden changes and rapid transition
The dynamic nature of cockpit operations can contribute to
a routine approach turning into a potentially critical situ-
ation in a matter of seconds (also relevant in Case 2 above).
In Case 5, the surprise element of pressing the wrong
button creates a delay in response as the pilots try to make
sense of what happened. The tempo of events is so high
that the crew have difficulties in re-framing and hence,
taking action. The first officer’s narrative offers an under-
standing for the increase in cognitive demands experienced
as he concurrently monitors the captain, the aircraft status
and surroundings and projects next steps (preparing to take
control if necessary).
Also portrayed in this situation is the challenge of not
knowing when to take control. The ambivalence of the
decision to take control is mentioned in several of the
interviews, commonly referring to pilots monitoring auto-
mated systems. In this example, the problem is knowing if
and when to take control from another crew member.
Case 5: On approach the captain wants to disengage
the autothrottle. The new captain mistakenly engages
the go-around button (which is close to the
autothrottle disengage button). The autopilot and
autothrottle respond quickly to ‘‘go-around mode’’,
instantly giving full power and raising the aircraft
nose 30. When the captain has disengaged the
autothrottle and autopilot the aircraft has gained
600–700 feet altitude and 30–40 knots of speed and
the captain decides not to continue the approach.
The first officer describes ‘‘It was switching the pic-
ture in your mind of being in an approach into the
picture of an automatic approach into the picture I
have to do a manual go-around. And this took some
time and during this time the aircraft accelerated and
pitched up and things like this. We never reached any
limit, but it was a challenging situation. […] I was a
little bit on the reluctant side to give any help or
advice [as the supervising captain wanting to see how
he reacted]. The only communication I did was I said
‘‘you hit the go-around button’’ and then watched
what he did. He acted correct but it took him some
time and I was concerned because he didn’t have
much experience on the aircraft: should I take over
or should I leave it to him? I left it to him and he did
it very fine, but he needed his time’’.
3.6 Case 6: Coping with insufficient system
knowledge
In the next example, Case 6, there is a glideslope warning,
but no other indication that the aircraft is not on the
intended flight path. Due to insufficient system knowledge,
the crew experience an uncomfortable uncertainty at a
critical flight phase.
Case 6: A crew using a Lateral Navigation/Vertical
Navigation approach get a glideslope warning on the
approach,4 the aural ‘‘glideslope’’ callout, while they
are on the calculated path. During an approach such a
callout has to be rectified or lead to a go-around.
There was no deviation visible in the cockpit of any
part of the flight path, ‘‘everything dead centre’’. The
problem, it turns out, is that the calculated path
depends on the QNH5 value received from the air-
port. However, apparently the airport reported QNH
was not so accurate, and when the captain uses the
wrong QNH, the system has a mismatch between the
calculated path and the targeted end-point (which is
based on QNH). Since the company policy is only to
use this approach procedure in daylight visual con-
ditions, the crew could confirm they were on the
glideslope, it was a spurious warning, and continue
the approach.
3.7 Case 7: Multiple goals and trade-offs
As with all air travel, there are a number of overarching
goals for the flight such as getting from A to B, ensuring
safety, fuel efficiency and keeping on schedule. Monitoring
and control activities are carried out to fulfil the goals and
4 Glideslope warning from the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning
System (EGPWS).
5 QNH is the barometric pressure adjusted to sea level.
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manage trade-offs based on current conditions. The sur-
prise in Case 7 exemplifies how multiple activities and
goals in the trade-off space can lead to confusion. This case
is also representative of the challenge described in case 9
‘‘roles and communication’’.
Case 7: On a long-haul flight there were three pilots,
which means that the pilots can take a rest during the
flight. The captain of the flight was also an instructor,
and thus allowed during cruise to sit in both the right
seat as well as in the left seat. The pilots agreed to
turn clockwise twice and then during landing every-
body would be back in their normal seats. Due to the
strong head wind they decided to fly at high speed to
avoid delays. Half way they hit more turbulence than
expected, moderate to severe. At the time the captain,
who was pilot flying, sat in the right seat. He
describes focusing his attention on the cabin, con-
sidering how the turbulence will affect the cabin crew
with trolleys and nervous passengers. At the same
time he was thinking about the effects in the back of
the plane he told the first officer to reduce the speed,
(a task that would normally be performed by the pilot
flying), because when you have turbulence you also
have speed variations and there is more risk of
entering an overspeed. The captain had mentally
resumed his command role of pilot not flying,6 and
was asking the first officer (who was pilot not flying)
to make the changes to the airspeed, rather than doing
it himself, as he should have done as pilot flying.
The captain describes: ‘‘I had the wrong mental state
at the moment and the wrong focus of attention and
the wrong priorities. I was pilot flying so I was going
back in management mode and captain mode but my
priority is flying the aircraft so I didn’t remember if I
was pilot flying or pilot not flying which is extremely
important. I think a lot of incidents they happen
because there is confusion ‘‘do I have to fly the air-
craft or do I have to solve the problem’’.
3.8 Case 8: Coping with uncertainty
As a crew depart from the airport and sets out for a long
night flight, the auto-pilot keeps turning off and the crew
cannot figure out why. In this case, they have to assess the
situation and decided whether they are willing to continue
the flight given the uncertain conditions.
Case 8: The flight was a night flight and the weather
was fine with no clouds and visual meteorological
conditions. During the initial climb the crew retracted
the gear and the flaps and afterwards tried to engage
the autopilot. After about 5 s the autopilot disengaged
automatically which lead to the execution of the
autopilot re-engage checklist. This procedure
demands that the aircraft be trimmed, and then re-
engage the autopilot, but the aircraft was still in trim
at that moment. The crew tried to re-engage the
autopilot several times with the same outcome that it
always disengaged after a few seconds. At this point
the pilot monitoring noticed that the left gear indi-
cation was green and red at the same time which
indicates that the gear is in the transition phase
between extended and retracted. Contrary to the
indication there was no sound of a retracted gear
audible. The pilot flying levelled the aircraft off at
about 5000 ft and flew manually. The pilot flying then
left his left seat to look for the circuit breaker panel at
the rear side of the cockpit to check for faults while
calling for help from the technicians on the ground
and at the same time communicating with air traffic
control.
The interviewee stated that he had an uncomfort-
able feeling after having checked the circuit breakers
without finding anything wrong. He was tired because
of the night flight, had the long flight time in mind
and that the remainder would have to be flown
manually in case they wouldn’t find the failure with
the autopilot. As the ground staff made the recom-
mendation to recycle the circuit breakers the crew
simultaneously decided to return to the departure
airport and land because they had no clue what could
have been the reason for that failure and didn’t want
to continue to their destination in this condition. The
pilot later found out that the probable cause of the
failure was a sensor problem that held the aircraft in
ground mode, which meant the autopilot wouldn’t
have engaged.
3.9 Case 9: Roles and communication
Team sensemaking can facilitate solving a problem as the
knowledge and experience of several people is available
tackling a problem. However, having multiple opinions
may also create problems as a course of action has to be
agreed upon.
Case 9: On this long-haul flight there were four pilots
in the cockpit: A captain, two first officers, and a
second officer. After take-off the crew realise that the
nose-wheel has not properly retracted, the cockpit
indication is that it is not in the safe retracted posi-
tion. The crew cycle the gear, down and up, which
6 The industry preferred term for Pilot Not Flying is now Pilot
Monitoring, though some companies and crew members may still
refer to Pilot Not Flying.
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didn’t resolve the situation. They come to the con-
clusion that they have to return to the airport. In order
to land safely they must dump fuel, which will take
about an hour, leaving ample time to discuss and
agree the safest way to land. There was also a
maintenance person on the aircraft as a passenger, so
the four pilots and the maintenance technician dis-
cussed the options. The maintenance technician
suggested that he knew exactly what had happened, a
hydraulic fault that might cause the nose gear to not
retract, but also means that the nose gear is turned
off-centre. Since it is night it is not possible to ask the
control tower or another flight to check the alignment
of the nose gear, if it was too far off-centre it may
cause problems on landing, driving the aircraft off the
runway or causing sparks or fire. There was a lot of
discussion between the pilots about their options
making it difficult to decide on a course of action.
Further, the captain was not very assertive, con-
tributing to the difficulties in assessing the options.
Eventually the two first officers and second officer
agreed on a strategy to land.
4 Analysis and discussion
Investigating the sensemaking process following surprise
in cockpit operations is to direct the spotlight on the con-
tinuous loop of the retro- and prospective processes pilots
use to explain the observed mismatch. A key aspect of the
sensemaking process is to examine how frames are con-
structed. Two models are used to illustrate the findings of
the analysis. The crew-aircraft sensemaking model outlines
and connects the core constructs of the re-framing process
(Fig. 1) and the D/F model (Fig. 7) highlights the activi-
ties, or ‘‘strategies’’, used by the pilots as they re-frame.
4.1 The crew-aircraft sensemaking model
The crew-aircraft sensemaking model (Fig. 1) outlines the
core concepts of the re-framing process and the sense-
making activities (further developed from (Rankin et al.
2013)). The crew-aircraft sensemaking model builds on (1)
the contextual control model (COCOM) (Hollnagel and
Woods 2005), and (2) the Data/Frame (D/F) model (Klein
et al. 2007). The COCOM model offers a cyclical account
of perception and action, and the D/F model described the
re-framing activities following surprise. Using a cyclical
model of perception–action such as the COCOM illustrates
the core of the sensemaking view that feedback from the
environment modifies the current frame, which in turn
guides the search for more information (and actions taken).
In this sense, pilots are, in a cyclic fashion, constantly
moving forward to further adapt the frame. For the purpose
of illustrating the joint system of the cockpit in the crew-
aircraft sensemaking model (Fig. 1), two COCOM loops
and an aircraft loop have been interlinked. The intercon-
nected loops in the model represent the dynamics between
the two crew members (pilot flying (PF) and pilot moni-
toring (PM)) and the aircraft. Two main loops for each
crew member describe the retrospective and prospective
processes of the re-framing process which together serve
the purpose of ascribing both meaning and action (Weick
et al. 2005). Red arrows for both PF and PM (jointly,
concurrently and in an iterative and cyclic manner) repre-
sent functions and processes (as described by (Klein et al.,
2003)). Yellow arrows describe aircraft processes and
external events and disturbances. Events, feedback and
cues from the process to be controlled modify and (re)-
construct the current frame (by PF and PM) of the situation.
This part of the loop focuses on cue seeking, data gathering
and problem detection.
Further, the cases have demonstrated the importance of
anticipatory aspects (expectations) of sensemaking, which
has been emphasised by adding the outer loops to the
original COCOM model. Both pilots engage in a loop of
anticipatory thinking, which focuses on functions and
processes of (re-)planning and mental simulation, gener-
ating expectations based on their current frame. Expecta-
tions reciprocally affect the frame based on the pilot’s
knowledge and experience. Coordination and maintaining a
joint understanding, or common ground (Clark 1996; Klein
et al. 2004a, b), is done through communication in the
cockpit (blue arrow), which also enables both loops to be a
crew effort through comparing and elaborating frames. The
central sensemaking processes (prospective and retrospec-
tive) are included in the model, and the sensemaking
activities from the original D/F model and those found in
the cases are mentioned on the right side of the figure and
include: question, preserve, elaborate, compare, switch,
abandon and rapid frame-switching.
The cyclic description of the sensemaking activities is at
a higher degree of abstraction, as illustrated in the D/F
model (Fig. 7). The D/F model shows the collection of re-
framing activities, or the ‘‘strategies’’, as described in the
nine cases. In the following sections, the re-framing
activities are presented in more detail, followed by the
resulting D/F model in Sect. 4.7.
4.2 Anticipatory thinking
The anticipatory part of sensemaking (the outer loops on
either side of Fig. 1) is in focus in the cases presented, as a
main ingredient in frame construction. Figure 2 illustrates
how expectations (dotted circle) guide attention as pilots
seek to confirm the current frame. Anticipatory thinking is
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used not only to cope with the unexpected after the fact, but
is also a means to avoid surprises. ‘‘Staying ahead of the
aircraft’’ (building expectations) was one of the strategies
mentioned in the interviews to prevent surprises. Moni-
toring activities are seen as a tool to shape the mind-set to
be alert, even in low workload phases. The strategy was
also described as ‘‘predicting the outcome of trends by
monitoring the aircraft’’, which can be seen as the con-
tinuous effort to update frames through an intuitive infor-
mation source where pilots are able to see trends early on
and help anticipate problems before they arise.
Anticipatory strategies such as the above mentioned are
key to increase pilot abilities to question frames, switch
frames rapidly and counteract getting stuck in frames or
even being surprised in the first place, and its importance
warrants further insights into what enables such strategies.
As discussed by Klein et al. (2007), what differs an expert
from a novice is not the reasoning process but the knowl-
edge base they work with. Feltovich et al. (1997) found that
novices identify relevant cues, but are not sure what to do
with the knowledge, and that experts (compared to novice)
are better at generating more anticipatory actions. Malakis
and Kontogiannis (2013) identified that more experienced
air traffic controllers are better than novices at applying a
set of performance criteria that enhance identification of
subtle cues and increased flexibility. These findings imply
that it may not be sufficient to rely on simple strategies to
cope with unexpected events (e.g. the oft-quoted basic
piloting principle of ‘‘aviate, navigate, communicate’’), it
requires experience to connect the dots, discern the
important cues, identify anchors and take action. It requires
more elaborate frames. Given the reliable and advanced
nature of modern airliners, there is a paradox between the
pilot’s ability to build expectations and thereby cope with
unexpected system actions, and the design of the aircraft
and its operating procedures which aim to anticipate and
prepare for system failures through careful design of
technology, procedures and training. Receiving less expo-
sure to variation in aircraft operations may thus be under-
mining pilot’s abilities to detect anomalies early on,
mitigate surprises by ‘‘staying ahead of the aircraft’’ and
cope with escalating situations. As demonstrated in the
interview cases, adapting to a changing environment in the
cockpit requires something different than what has been
anticipated through system design, it requires detection of
anomalies, framing and re-framing of situations and
knowing what actions are applicable.
4.3 Question and preserve frames
Being surprised is a trigger to question the current frame,
as shown in Fig. 3. Triggers may be directly visible or
Fig. 2 Anticipatory thinking. Frames include expectations (dotted
circle) and observed data (full circle). Expectations guide attention,
and when confirmed they are incorporated into the frame
Fig. 1 Crew-aircraft contextual control loop. Core concepts of re-
framing include the retrospective and prospective process used to
construct a frame and take action (illustrated on the left side).
Sensemaking activities in the re-framing process identified in the nine
cases are questioning, preserving, elaborating, comparing, switching
and abandoning the search for a Frame, and rapid frame-switching
(illustrated on the right side)
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audible cues, or ques that require a certain expertise and
attention management (Woods and Sarter 2010). Chal-
lenges associated with questioning the frame exemplify the
very core of the crew-aircraft sensemaking model, that is,
in order to detect inconsistent data, the individual or team
has to focus their attention on the specific data that deviates
from the frame at just the right time. In most of the
described cases, there are clear indications such as visual
and audio warnings (e.g. case 3, 6, 7, 8) or notable physical
changes in the environment (e.g. case 5). However,
detecting that there is a problem, that is, questioning a
frame is not always straightforward.
Case 1 exemplifies a crew preserving the frame in a
situation where cues are nonexistent or subtle. The crew
believe they are flying on autopilot, when in fact the air-
craft is flying in a trimmed state and the difference is dif-
ficult to detect. Reason for the mismatch (forgot to switch
on second autopilot) occurred earlier and are likely to be
disassociated with the current status. In Case 3, the crew
initially discard the warning and preserve their original
frame, assuming it is a system fault that does not warrant
any further attention. Only once other unexpected beha-
viour starts to occur do they question and search for a new
frame.
Getting stuck in a frame, or preserving a frame, and
using this frame to explain discrepancies observed is fur-
ther exemplified in Case 4. Initially, the crew question and
elaborate the frame, determining that the cause is leaking
fuel. The initial hypothesis guides the actions taken, and
alternate causes for the failures are left unexplored. The
findings are consistent with previous studies showing that
crews often do not notice inconsistencies or faulty values,
although the data are visible on the system displays
(Woods and Sarter 2010). It also demonstrates that once a
plausible frame is identified the search for alternative
causes stops (Klein et al. 2007), something that can lead to
critical events going undetected. The problem of getting
stuck in one frame and failure to see inconsistencies or look
for alternative explanations has been described as fixation
error (De Keyser and Woods 1990).
4.4 Team sensemaking and seeking a new frame:
elaborate and compare
Seeking a new frame is the process of actively searching
for anchors to identify a frame that can explain what is
being observed. One strategy is to gather additional
information, or elaborate a frame (Fig. 4, left image). By
widening the already existing frame, the mismatch can be
resolved, as exemplified in Cases 2, 4, 5 and 7. The
elaboration does not require any changes in the under-
standing of the system and ongoing process, but rather an
update, also described as a situational surprise (Lanir
1986). Note that although an elaboration is made, and the
mismatch is resolved, this does not necessarily imply that
the elaborated frame is correct, as in Case 4 (see previous
section).
Another strategy is to compare and match available
frames, that is, test plausible hypotheses against the
observed mismatch (Fig. 4, right image). We hypothesise
that this strategy is used more frequently when the degree
of uncertainty is high, such as in Case 3 and 8. The nar-
ratives in Case 3 and 8 describe the search for a new frame
and the frustration of not identifying one that can account
for all the inconsistencies. Comparing and matching frames
can be done by the individual, or as shown in several of the
Cases (3, 6, 8 and 9), as a team (as illustrated in Fig. 1).
Sensemaking as a team effort involves the co-creation of
knowledge, a process which may vary in shape and form,
as discussed by (Klein et al. 2010a, b). In the cockpit, both
pilots are responsible for detecting and acting on issues that
come up, and training, procedures and checklist are gen-
erally designed to facilitate joint understanding, or com-
mon ground (Clark 1996; Klein et al. 2004a, b). Team
efforts are demonstrated in several cases where pilots share
ideas to elaborate and compare frames (e.g. Case 3, 6, 8
and 9). Team sensemaking may also be a matter of helping
another person identify the right frame by providing an
anchor (i.e. a cue that allows identification of the right
frame, or ‘‘putting the pieces together’’), as exemplified in
Case 5 when the first officer informs the captain that he
mistakenly pushed the ‘‘go-around’’ button. Team sense-
making can, however, also obstruct the re-framing process.
In Case 4, it can be argued that the inclusion of additional
frames from the captain was obstructed by the first officer
initially presenting ‘‘the problem’’ (i.e. the frame). In case
9, the pilots describe the challenge of deciding on a course
of action when there are different opinions and no strong
leader. Also playing into the team sensemaking abilities in
the cockpit is the fact that the roles and responsibilities of
the two pilots are different, and therefore so is the frame to
anticipate events and plan actions. This is exemplified in
Case 7 where one pilot is confused about the roles and
overlooks critical cues connected to the current role.
Fig. 3 Sensemaking activity questioning a frame. When an unex-
pected event occurs and the data (the cloud) do not fit the frame this
leads to a questioning of the frame
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4.5 Rapid frame-switching
The examples of rapid frame-switching, in cases 2, 5 and
7 show how tightly connected the prospective (expecta-
tions), and retrospective processes of sensemaking are in
the sense that the current frame includes a plan for
upcoming actions, and if this frame has to be updated, this
may take precious seconds. As shown in Fig. 5, new data
require a new frame, and the short arrow illustrates the
time pressure. The challenge of this task is further
increased as pilots have to switch between multiple tasks,
which may result in deferring or omitting tasks, as
described in detail in the studies conducted by (Louko-
poulos et al. 2009). In case 2, the automation compensates
for turbulence up to a point, and then shuts off, leaving the
pilots to rapidly take over. The challenges of having to
take over and fly manually when the automation can no
longer handle a situation have been discussed in more
detail in other research (e.g. Woods and Branlat 2011;
Woods and Sarter 2000).
4.6 Abandon the search for a frame and take action
In cockpit operations, swift actions may be required
regardless of situational ambiguities. Although most
system failures and contextual variations have a prepared
response through checklists and procedures, as demon-
strated in the cases, a major problem for the pilots is to
make sense of what is going on and the inability to do
may create a challenge in identifying an appropriate
response (e.g. Case 1, 3, 7, 8).
Deciding on a course of action in ambiguous situation
often involves deciding when (and if) to go from monitor
of automated (and highly reliable) systems to more direct
controller of the aircraft. Case 3 exemplifies this process
where the crew initially let the automation handle it, but
subsequently decide to take over when ‘‘enough’’ incon-
sistencies occur and the aircraft deviates from the intended
flight path. The first warning the crew get is disregarded, as
they assume it is a system failure (preserve the frame). As
more faults start to appear they question the frame again
and seek to elaborate their frame to explain the discrep-
ancies. The crew are not able to identify a plausible frame,
and as the aircraft deviates from its intended flight path
they have to act. The crew abandon the search for a frame
and take control of the aircraft through manual flying, that
is, adopting a known frame (Fig. 6). Rather than continue
troubleshooting to fulfil the goal of explaining the dis-
crepancies, the crew re-structure the joint system in a way
that allows them to build a new, coherent frame and take
action and thus fulfil the goal of controlling the aircraft.
Accepting a lack of understanding for the situation, but
knowing enough not to trust the automation was described
by several interviewees.
Although in some cases the decision to take manual
control seems clear, the respondents mention that ‘‘know-
ing when to take over’’ can be a challenge. On the one
hand, it was felt that manual control should be resumed
when confused about what the automation is doing. The
strategy enables the pilots to reduce complexity, that is,
‘‘identify what you have, not what you don’t have’’, and
apply a known frame. It is seen as important to ‘‘aviate
first’’, referring back to the basic piloting principle in
Fig. 4 Sensemaking activities
Elaborating a frame (left image)
and comparing frames (right
image). A frame is elaborated
when new data are fitted to the
current frame. Frames are
compared when different
hypotheses are tested
Fig. 5 Sensemaking activity rapid frame-switching. The time avail-
able to change the course of actions takes longer than desirable due to
the short time frame pilots have to evaluate, select and perform
actions
Fig. 6 Sensemaking activity abandoning search for a frame. When
unable to identify a plausible frame the search may be abandoned
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aviation to do things in order of ‘‘aviate, navigate, com-
municate’’. However, several interviewees also felt that
there are many situations when it is better to ‘‘let the
automation handle the situation’’, as this minimises the
workload and may be of assistance in a confusing situation.
Such a situation may be, for example, sudden changes
caused by a mountain wave or hitting the squall line. A rule
of thumb mentioned during the interviews was to ‘‘sit on
your hands’’ and evaluate the situation. That some situa-
tions require rapid intervention (e.g. rapid frame-switch-
ing) makes it increasingly difficult to know when to stop
and first evaluate the situation.
Another aspect of switching the goal from ‘‘under-
standing the problem’’ to controlling the aircraft is that the
pilots’ frame is still incomplete in the sense that the crew
are confused about the state of the aircraft and systems and
further consequences this may have. The crew prioritisa-
tion strategy, for example, ‘‘aviate first’’ inevitably means
that certain tasks and goals are deferred to prioritise others.
Although the coping strategy is necessary, it makes the
crew-aircraft system more susceptible to performance
breakdowns such as ‘‘falling behind the curve’’ (Woods
and Branlat 2011), as the prioritised activities are time-
consuming and consequences of actions are uncertain.
The importance and challenges of knowing when to take
manual control can be seen in recent accidents. For
example, in response to an in-flight upset caused by faults
in the aircraft systems, the response of the crew of Qantas
flight QF72 in their manual handling of the aircraft was
praised in the accident report (ATSB 2013). In contrast, the
manual intervention of the flight crew of Air Canada flight
AC190 in response to a wake turbulence-induced upset was
suggested as a contributory factor in the incident (TSB
2008). The interviewees in the study mentioned that taking
control too quickly may be overreacting and exacerbate the
situation, a problem that unfortunately has been an aspect
of the investigation in the recent accidents such as flights
AF447 (BEA 2012) and QZ8501 (KNKT 2015).
The decision to take control is not only troublesome when
it comes to the automated systems, but may also concern
another crew members’ ability to cope with the current sit-
uation, as exemplified in Case 5 and 7. A decision to take
over as pilot flying (PF) may also include additional con-
siderations, such as social and organisational factors. In Case
5, for example, the high level of experience of the first officer
and the low level of experience of the captain on the par-
ticular aircraft type was an important factor, as well as the
fact that this was a supervision flight. The concern expressed
by the first officer illustrates the multiple goals being jug-
gled; keep the aircraft on the intended flight path, support the
PF without interruption and avoid causing any potential
future problems for the captain (e.g. consequences of making
mistakes during supervised flight).
4.7 Linking the sensemaking activities
Figure 7 shows the relations between the sensemaking
activities described in the cases above. Two sensemaking
activities have been identified that are not part of the
original D/F model (Klein et al. 2007); rapid frame-
switching and abandoning the search for a frame. Both
activities are closely connected with the ability to stay in
control following unexpected events. The surprise factor
may in some situation leads to discarding the data and
preserving the frame, if the data are not seen as relevant.
However, in most cases it will lead to a questioning of the
frame. Following questioning of the frame, several activi-
ties have been identified; elaborating a frame to include the
new data, rapid frame-switching to re-gain control of the
situation and the iterative process of seeking a new frame
through comparing frames. If a plausible frame is identi-
fied, a switch to this frame is made. If a frame cannot be
identified in a timely manner, the search for a plausible
frame may be abandon, and a new goal will be prioritised
using a known frame (e.g. turning off the automation).
4.8 Implications for sensemaking theory
The results from this study reveal several new insights
regarding the D/F theory of sensemaking (Klein et al.
2007). First, the crew-aircraft sensemaking model offers a
description of the D/F theory as part of a joint system,
including the connections between the two pilots and the
aircraft systems, as well as between a perception–action
cycle and sensemaking concepts. Although many studies
target pilot’s understanding at particular points in time, that
is, their situation awareness (Endsley 2006), the processes
that explain how they got there is relatively understudied.
A key contribution of this study is thus the application of a
sensemaking perspective to cockpit surprise. Further, the
crew-aircraft sensemaking model emphasises the retro-
spective and prospective processes of sensemaking
demonstrating the relationship between frame construction,
expectations (anticipatory thinking) and actions. The con-
nections underline the significance of expectations and
actions as part of the decision process to test hypotheses
and seek anchors to identify new frames. Similarly, the
output from the automated systems and cues in the envi-
ronment (e.g. aircraft behaviour, weather) affect the crews’
ability to identify anchors and decide on a course of action.
Due to the sample size and previously mentioned
drawbacks of individual accounts provided in retrospect,
the generalised findings are pending further validation.
However, the relevance of the key finding that expectations
guide problem detection, situation assessments and the
ability to take action should also be viewed in the light of
related studies of joint cognitive systems, including the
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original studies of the D/F model (Klein et al. 2007), the
study of sensemaking in air traffic control (Malakis and
Kontogiannis 2013), studies of anomaly response (Watts-
Perotti and Woods 2007) and how expert practitioners
extract dynamic data from ongoing event Christoffersen
et al. (2007). Although studies of sensemaking have com-
monly been case based, the research conducted by
Christoffersen et al. (2007) offers empirical evidence of the
importance of expectations as domain experts in human-
technical systems identify key pieces of information and
make sense of multiple ongoing processes. Research in
social sciences further substantiates the importance of the
prospective processes to detect that which is unexpected
(e.g. Dunbar 1997).
Second, several of the sensemaking activities identified
in the original D/F model (Klein et al. 2007) are also found
in the cases described in this study (and Fig. 7), including
questioning, elaborating, preserving and comparing frames.
Noteworthy from the cases (in particular cases 3, 8 and 9)
is the complexity and the ‘‘messiness’’ of the re-framing
process. A re-framing process may include the complex
sequence of questioning, seeking, preserving, re-question-
ing, elaborating and comparing frames within a short time
frame. Elaborating and comparing frames appear in some
cases to be performed concurrently, suggesting that in
some cases the activities should not be studied individually
but as part of several ongoing activities in the re-framing
process. Also important to note is that the cases show that
although the crew elaborate, compare and identify a frame
that matches what they observe, this does not necessarily
mean that the frame can account for what is actually going
on. Likewise, preserving a frame does not necessarily
require discarding data (as described in the original D/F
model), it could also mean that no cues are available for the
crew, or that the crew initially had the correct frame and
that whatever caused the surprise can be understood within
the available frame.
Third, sensemaking activities in addition to the ones
identified in the original D/F model (Klein et al. 2007) have
been included; rapid frame-switching and abandoning the
search for a frame (Fig. 7). Both activities are closely
connected with the ability to stay in control following
unexpected events. The examples of rapid frame-switching
show how tightly connected the prospective (expectations),
and retrospective processes of sensemaking are in the sense
that the current frame includes a plan for upcoming actions,
and if this frame has to be updated, the recovery period
may take precious seconds as an aircraft suddenly deviates
from the unintended flight path. Abandoning the search for
a frame and building a known frame is a common strategy
mentioned to cope with uncertainty. Knowing that there is
not enough knowledge, enough data or enough time to
troubleshoot and identify the problem is critical ability.
The strategy requires knowing when it is appropriate to
Fig. 7 Data-Frame (D/F)
model showing the sensemaking
activities in the re-framing
process following surprise
found in the nine cases. Two
sensemaking activities have
been added that are not part of
the original D/F model (Klein
et al. 2007); rapid frame-
switching and abandon search
for frame
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abandon the goal of trying to resolve the ambiguities of the
current frame and instead focus on the goal of controlling
the aircraft, thus switching the frame altogether.
4.9 Implications for training
The basic philosophy in training programmes today is to
emphasise the procedures for particular failure situations,
as recommended by the regulators or manufacturers.
Training scenarios largely focus on pre-defined skills in
context-specific scenarios where pilots know what to
expect, leaving exposure to variations, multiple system
failures and unexpected events to mature through experi-
ence. Shortcomings of current training are being recog-
nised in industry today and attempts to improve them
include international industry initiatives such as evidence-
based-training (EBT) (ICAO 2013). EBT is a data-driven
approach which involves the identification of needs of the
operation through analysis of operational flight data and
allows more flexible training programmes, rather than
regulatory-prescribed. While existing airline pilot training
requirements ‘‘are largely based on evidence from hull
losses from early generation jets, and on a simple view that,
in order to mitigate risk, simply repeating an event in
training programmes was sufficient’’ (ICAO 2013, p. I-1-
1), EBT aims to not only use more current events but also
to assess crew performance based on a number of key
competencies. EBT, among other recent training initia-
tives, can be implemented under current regulations for
alternative training concepts7 and is along with other
training initiatives a sign of the aviation industry aiming
generally to improve training to be more relevant and
effective (see also Learmount 2011, 2014; Varney 2012).
An issue to consider regarding the emerging training
programmes is the characterisation of the identified evi-
dence-based problems (see also Klein et al. 2016), i.e. to
answer the question of which evidence should be collected
and how it should be characterised in order to improve
training. Although a shift is made to target current issues
(rather than evidence from early jets), many training pro-
grammes still focus on aiding pilots to tackle specific
known problems. This approach does not focus generally
on training the processes involved with problem detection,
problem identification and interacting variables and con-
ditions. Findings in this study suggest the need for training
programmes and pilot examiners to support pilots to
identify the connection between system parts and identifi-
cation of critical cues, rather than the specific procedures
for specific incidents that have occurred recently. This
could be, for example, to emphasise the underlying
sensemaking aspects that may be common to multiple sit-
uations, using the categorisation of these processes as
presented in this article. This research suggests that training
to cope with surprise (as a concept also mentioned in the
ICAO (2013) report) should be preceded by a thorough
understanding how crews (re-)construct their frames in
response to unexpected events. This type of scenario could
lead to considerations of what are critical frame-breakers,
that is, relevant cues that help crews interpret and assess an
ongoing situation.
Again, the focus in training should be on the process
with which pilots cope with surprise and uncertainty, rather
than identifying the lack of competencies or ‘‘loss of Sit-
uation Awareness (SA)’’. A recent study of the application
of a competency assessment tool shows large inconsisten-
cies in how flight examiners assess the different compe-
tencies (Weber et al. 2014), suggesting that broad
categories pose validity issues to making assessments. The
inconsistencies were found particularly evident for the
category of ‘‘situation awareness’’, and Weber et al. (2014)
hypothesise this result is due to difficulties in examiners’
attempts to theorise what is going on in a pilot’s head. The
same study further found the assessment of SA was highly
coupled to the ratings of other competencies. In the light of
this article, these results are not surprising. The analysis of
the cases shows that the complexity of sensemaking (i.e.
the processes ‘‘leading up to SA’’) involves multiple
intertwined processes and is a highly contextualised
activity, and thus difficult to summarise into one over-
arching category. The abilities to identify cues, diagnose
problems and take actions are all based on sensemaking,
which is why it is necessarily coupled to other skills. The
findings of the current study suggest that the underlying
training issue to cope with surprise is to understand and
support the process with which pilots frame and re-frame
data based on their knowledge and available ques. By
shifting focus to understanding the process by which pilots
search for data, identify relevant ques, manage uncertain-
ties, make trade-offs, re-frame and decide on a course of
action, a more in-depth understanding for breakdowns of
crew-aircraft coordination can be made to inform training
design.
5 Summary of findings and future research
The findings of this study reveal several important issues
regarding challenges and possibilities for pilots to maintain
control in surprise situations. The cases described suggest
that pilots have difficulties in making sense and re-framing
following surprise, sometimes leading to difficulties in
7 Examples of alternative training regulatory frameworks are the
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA): Alternative Training and
Qualification Programme (ATQP) and the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA): Advanced Qualification Programme (AQP).
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identifying an appropriate response. Crews are struggling
to elaborate and build coherent frames with limited time to
do so.
The main contributions of this study are:
• Analysis of surprise situations demonstrating difficul-
ties pilots have re-framing following surprise. To cope
with most disturbances and failures, there is a prepared
response in the form of procedures and checklists.
However, the cases show the difficulty of understand-
ing the situation, and as a result having trouble
identifying which response is appropriate.
• Anticipatory strategies to ‘‘stay ahead of the aircraft’’ are
used to keep frames updated and avoid surprise. As
expectations guide attention, anticipatory strategies are key
to increase pilots’ abilities to question frames, to switch
frames rapidly and to counteract getting stuck in frames or
even being surprised in the first place. The findings imply
that it may not be sufficient to rely on simple strategies to
cope with unexpected events, it requires more elaborate
frames that are built through experience.
• The crew-aircraft sensemaking model offers a descrip-
tion of the Data/Frame (D/F) theory (Klein et al. 2007)
as part of a joint system, including the interactions
between the two pilots and the aircraft systems. Further,
the model highlights the retrospective and prospective
processes of sensemaking by illustrating the relation-
ships between frame construction, expectations (antic-
ipatory thinking) and taking action.
• Identification of previously found sensemaking activi-
ties, as presented in the D/F model. The cases presented
in this paper further demonstrate the complexity and the
‘‘messiness’’ of the re-framing process as it involves
sensemaking activities concurrently or within a very
short time frame, suggesting that activities should be
investigated as joint activities in the re-framing process.
• Sensemaking activities have been identified that are
not part of the original D/F model; rapid frame-
switching and abandoning the search for a frame. Both
activities are closely connected with the ability to stay
in control following unexpected events. Rapid frame-
switching requires an action within a very short time
frame as a response to an external event and
represents the critical ability of pilots to quickly
switch frames to manage surprise in cockpit. Aban-
doning the search for a frame is a strategy to cope
with uncertainty. It is the decision to stop an active
search for a coherent frame. The strategy used by the
pilots is to simplify the system configuration by
turning the automation off so that a different, known
frame, can be applied, thus switching the goal from
making sense of the situation to the goal of controlling
the aircraft.
• The findings raise important issues regarding pilot
training programmes. Training programmes today often
focus on aiding pilots to tackle specific known prob-
lems through procedures, and it does not focus
generally on training the processes involved with
tackling problems following unexpected events such
as problem detection, problem identification and decid-
ing on a course of action. Findings in this study suggest
a need for training programmes and examiners to
support pilots to better understand the re-framing
process and factors which may facilitate or hinder the
process.
Based on these findings, we suggest three main areas to
improve pilot abilities to cope with unexpected events. For
each area, we have outlined critical research questions:
1. Further investigation into what enables and obstructs
the re-framing process.
Frame-breakers What are critical frame-breakers (i.e.
relevant cues or data that allow questioning of the
current frame) that allow pilots to update their frames?
What factors (patterns) obstruct and enable detection
of abnormalities and subtle cues? This includes, for
example, the coupling between sensors and symptoms,
what information is (not) trusted, and differences in
how experts and novices detect symptoms.
Re-framing strategies What strategies do pilots use to
make sense of situations where data elements are not
clearly specified (see, e.g., Rankin et al, 2014)? Are
there particular performance criteria that are used?
How can the joint crew-automation system facilitate
the elaboration and matching of frames? How can
display design facilitate frame construction? What are
key indicators (anchors) of particular problems that can
help pilots identify the right frame?
Level of system knowledge What are the frames of
system knowledge today? What are patterns of break-
down due to oversimplifications (i.e. simplified models
of the automated systems)? How do they manifest in
surprise situations? What frames do experts have that
novices lack? Are frames similar or very different
between pilots? Do some (interactions between) sys-
tems create more difficulties than others (implying that
frames are not well-connected)? A distinction made by
the interview participants is that it is necessary to have
a model for why the systems act a particular way, but
not necessarily all the intricacies of how. The data
provided by automated systems must facilitate frame
construction as well as guide pilots in breaking frames
when failures occur to allow a well-functioning
interplay between crew and automation.
2. Exposure to surprise situations in training to develop
re-framing strategies.
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Training programmes How can training programmes
help prepare crews for the unexpected? Industry focus
today is on anticipating and mitigating variations,
faults and failures at a system level, and crews have
little exposure to unexpected events. Training pro-
grammes are focused on handling known problems.
Studies have shown that building elaborate frames
through experience is a critical part of being able to
separate important cues from ‘‘noise’’, identify anchors
to retrieve frames, and use frames to generate appro-
priate action (in a timely manner). By including more
challenging and unexpected situations in pilot training
frames and re-framing strategies can be developed.
More elaborate frames allow pilots to anticipate (i.e.
build expectations) and thus mitigate surprises. Indus-
try should acknowledge that all situations cannot be
prepared for through system design and procedures,
and prepare pilots to cope with situations that fall
outside of textbook scenarios.
3. Identification of control strategies as part of the re-
framing process when aspects of the situation are not
clearly specified.
Control strategies What strategies can be used to
regain control in situations governed by uncertainty?
When constraints such as time or expertise do not
allow necessary elaboration of a frame, what are key
factors in constructing new frames (and abandoning
the search for frames) to control the aircraft? What are
the strength and vulnerabilities of such strategies? In
following up the results of this study, an initial
examination has been carried out into the potential
benefit of training basic anticipatory strategies to flight
crew and providing a strategy to assist them in
responding to an unexpected event (Field et al. 2015;
Woltjer et al. 2015).
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